Spain holds a general election on November 29, 2026. On November 11, the Spanish fact-checking outlet Maldita.es reported that a Russian influence operation known as Matryoshka had started a campaign aimed at that vote. The findings came from Antibot4Navalny, a volunteer project that tracks the operation on X.
The campaign posts videos made to look like reports by El País and El Mundo, plus posts that use the names of The Economist and France 24. According to The Insider, it also circulates fake magazine covers styled after French publications, one of them dated November 10 under the headline "Elections Will Change Nothing." Some videos put claims in the mouths of real Spanish economists. The messages follow one line, which Antibot4Navalny summed up as: "The housing crisis is the tip of the iceberg: the economy is doomed, elections won't help." The suggested fixes are to leave the EU, lift sanctions on Russia, and split off Catalonia.
Five days later, on November 16, the Council of the EU sanctioned 30 individuals and two entities over Russian information manipulation and cyberattacks. The list includes the Social Design Agency, a Moscow company the Council says runs "large-scale information manipulation and interference projects" that are "funded, directed and supervised by the Russian Presidential Administration," and 24 people who work for it. The sanctions are a separate decision from the Spanish findings. After the meeting, Italy's foreign minister, Antonio Tajani, warned that such attacks "risk interfering with the elections due to take place in many European countries, from Spain to France to Italy."
Why this matters for your team
The useful detail is how Matryoshka spreads. France's agency for foreign digital interference, VIGINUM, studied the operation in June 2024. It found that one set of accounts posts a fake, and a second set drops it into the replies under posts by media outlets, public figures, and fact-checkers in more than 60 countries, asking them to check whether it's real. The operators also send these requests by email.
VIGINUM concluded that reach seemed to be a secondary goal, given how little audience and engagement the posts got. The main aim was probably to discredit the outlets and fact-checkers it targeted, including when they reacted in public. In some cases, outlets that answered or wrote about the fakes then faced a flood of new requests meant to use up their capacity to investigate.
That pattern matters for any organization with a public voice. A fake video about your candidate, your union, or your campaign is built to make you look at it, answer it, and repeat it. A screenshot of the fake under a "this is false" caption still puts the fake in front of new people. And the "elections won't change anything" message is aimed at turnout, which makes it your problem even when no one names you.
Four habits for the weeks before a vote
- Check the outlet before anyone reacts. A logo on a video is not a source. Look for the story on the outlet's own site or official account before your team or your supporters share it, answer it, or reply to it. If it isn't there, treat it as a fake until the outlet says otherwise.
- Don't answer in the replies. Matryoshka works by getting a response under someone else's post. Decide as a team whether a fake is reaching real people before you say anything. If it isn't, ignore it. If it is, correct it on your own channel, in your own words, without reposting the fake image, and link the outlet's or a fact-checker's statement.
- Prebunk with your supporters now. Tell them what this looks like before they see it: news videos with familiar branding, magazine covers that don't exist, and quotes attributed to real experts. Give them one rule, such as "if it's only on social media, it isn't news yet," and one place to send what they find.
- Answer the message, not the fake. The campaign's point is that voting is useless. You don't need to quote it to answer it. A mission that asks supporters to tell a friend why they're voting, in their own words, answers the message without spreading the fake.
When you do need to report an impersonation, have one person send it to the outlet that was impersonated and to a fact-checker, with links and screenshots. Asking supporters to mass-report accounts can look like coordinated abuse in its own right.
Where Ostracon fits
Ostracon gives a team a briefing that recommends whether to ignore, mirror, or push, with ignore as the default when a post is bait, and a person on the team makes the call. Missions go to consenting, unpaid supporters, who act in their own words, and every mission stays in a permanent archive. Ostracon doesn't judge whether a video is real, doesn't detect bots, and doesn't send mass-reporting missions.
Sources
- La operación rusa 'Matrioska' lanza una campaña para interferir en las elecciones del 29N en España, Maldita.es, November 11, 2026
- Russia's Matryoshka bot network launches new campaign ahead of Spanish general election, The Insider, November 11, 2026
- Russia's FIMI and malicious cyber activities: Council imposes sanctions on 30 individuals and two entities, Council of the EU press release, November 16, 2026
- EU Council sanctions 30 individuals and two Russian entities over cyberattacks and other malicious cyber activities, Eunews, November 16, 2026
- Matriochka: une campagne prorusse ciblant les médias et la communauté des fact-checkers, VIGINUM technical report, June 2024